Skip to main content

Zero to HRO (High Reliability Organisation)

Despite all the latest trendy spin about safety disruption the language in this paper was considered to be too “inflammatory” for publication in a mainstream traditional Safety Journal (download it and you will see why) – so it gives me great pleasure to publish it here:

Zero to HRO (High Reliability Organisation)

Abandoning antediluvian accident theory

DOWNLOAD THIS PAPER HERE:  Zero-to-HRO.docx (33 downloads)

Abstract
The recent resources boom in Australia saw a commensurate focus on occupational health and safety management. It also presented a unique opportunity to generate transformational change using a process and evidence based approach.
However, direct observation of activities and anecdotal evidence from colleagues on various projects, indicates there has been a significant resurgence of traditional accident theory. This has been supplemented with an array of nebulous soft systems change management processes, which includes the ubiquitous concept of zero harm.
This paper evaluates the attributes of risk and energy damage theory and accident theory and compares them with the contemporary Shingo model of operational excellence and features of high reliability organisations.
It recommends abandoning conventional accident theory and adopting risk and energy damage theory, which offers a process and evidence based approach to align with the guiding principles of operational excellence and the unique attributes of high reliability organisations.
Keywords
Accident theory, risk theory, operational excellence, high reliability organisations
Conflict of interest
The author of this paper declares no conflict of interest

DOWNLOAD THIS PAPER HERE:  Zero-to-HRO.docx (33 downloads)


CONCLUSION

The 21st October 2016 marks 50 years since the Aberfan disaster in South Wales, United Kingdom 117 which resulted in the deaths of 116 school children and 28 adults and wiped out a generation.
Over the past 50 years, legislation has been implemented and supplemented by the introduction of many fashionable psychological approaches, which have been offered as silver bullets. 118
However, traditional accident theory and its many accoutrements remain enduringly popular despite their ostentatiously unscientific principles and social encumbrances. 119
Meanwhile, the carnage continues unabated and our performance can only be described as mediocre, at best. In Australia, the annual direct costs amount to approximately $80 billion or almost 8% of our gross domestic product. 120
Moreover, the comments from Haddon et al 121 and Waller and Klein, 122 remain as pertinent today and still resonate with most academics and safety professionals.

Reactive accident theory does not manage risk or measure performance, we are merely counting with our fingers and toes crossed until…………………………………………..
Westgate Bridge (1970), Ibrox Park (1971), Summerland (1973), Flixborough (1974), Granville (1977), Seveso (1976), Three Mile Island (1979), Bhopal (1984), Bradford (1985), Chernobyl (1986), Zeebrugge (1987), Kings Cross Station (1987), Piper Alpha (1988), Hillsborough (1989), Thredbo’ (1997), Esso Longford (1998), Texas City Refinery (2005), Qinghe Steel China (2007), Deepwater Horizon (2010), Fukushima (2011), Lac Megantic (2013), Samarco (2015) and ………………………………………………………??????
It was the murderous tyrant, Joseph Stalin, (he was pretty conversant with totalitarian regimes and dystopian environments), who coined the phrase…..one death is a tragedy and a thousand deaths is a statistic.
On a much less sombre note, W. Edwards Deming, at a 1982 seminar in the United States, commented……there are two ways to improve figures; cheat or lie and just change the numbers and don’t count injuries or defective parts or improve the process. 123
Transformational change will only occur when antediluvian accident theory is abandoned in favour of a process and evidence based approach and incidentally, this transition does not require tearing the entire house down.
Risk and energy damage theory fulfills this requirement and it reflects and aligns with the contemporary guiding principles of operational excellence and unique characteristics of high reliability organisations. It has many advantages over accident theory and its attributes are compared and summarised in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Accident theory v risk and energy damage theory attributes

Accident theoryRisk and energy damage theory
Subjective speculationObjective evaluation
HierarchicalOrganic
AdversarialCollaborative
Downstream human focusUpstream technological focus
General riskGeneral & operational risk
DescriptiveProcess and evidence based
Linear and mechanistic cause-effectSystemic
IntuitiveScientific
CountingMeasuring
PejorativeConstructive
Reactive hindsightPredictive and preventive foresight
BlameworthyVirtuous
QualitativeQuantitative
Change the personChange the situation
Receiver focusSource focus

DOWNLOAD THIS PAPER HERE:  Zero-to-HRO.docx (33 downloads)

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Curriculum and Bodies of Knowledge as Instructional Affordances

  Curriculum and Bodies of Knowledge as Instructional Affordances An affordance is created by design eg. a chair affords ‘sitting’ by design, a cup affords ‘drinking’ by design, a ball afford ‘kicking’ by design and water is designed for drinking and swimming. Understanding affordance is foundational to safety in design, usability and ethics. If one was talking about document usability and didn’t investigate affordances, I wouldn’t waste my time in its study. It is quite odd that Safety expects people to ‘speak up’ about un-safety when the culture of blaming common in safety suppresses it. Blaming and shame create psychological affordances. Slogans create affordances like; ‘safety is a choice you make’, ‘all accidents are preventable’ create a belief state that confirms and affirms safety myths about determinism and power. Such slogans hide beliefs that shape thoughts and actions. If you want to understand the nature of affordance, the following are helpful: · Letiche, H., ...

Systems as Imagined v Systems in Practice

Systems as Imagined v Systems in Practice The recent NSW Supreme Court decision,  Attorney General of New South Wales v Tho Services Limited (in liquidation) (ACN 000 263 678) [2016] NSWCCA 221  is another in a long line of decisions that highlight the disconnect between safety management systems as they are documented, and what occurs in practice. Documented safety processes are important.  They provide guidance on how safety is managed and evidence that an organisation is meeting its obligations.  However, where an accident reveals long-term, systemic non-compliance with obvious safety expectations documented safety processes do not provide a defence, often they do not provide mitigation, and in cases such as this they are an aggravating circumstance.  As the Court noted: The vast range of induction and supervising protocols adopted by the respondent or in force at its premises serves not to relieve the respondent of its responsibility for safety but on...